This paper examines the time-varying policy neutral interest rate in real time for the Czech Republic in 2001:1-2006:09, estimating various specifications of simple Taylor-type monetary policy rules. For this reason, we apply a structural time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. The results indicate that the policy neutral rate gradually decreased over the sample period to levels comparable to those in the euro area. Next, we propose a measure of the monetary policy stance based on the deviation of the actual interest rate from the estimated policy neutral rate and find it a useful predictor of the level as well as the change of the future inflation rate.
Introduction
Inflation targeting regimes are increasingly popular around the world. For example, regarding Central and Eastern Europe, while the first two countries adopted explicit inflation targeting regime back in 1998, there were already seven countries conducting inflation targeting in 2006 and others were contemplating doing so (International Monetary Fund, 2006) . 1 A characteristic feature of inflation targeting is that central banks set the short-term nominal interest rate (path) so as to get inflation and output to their targeted levels. The level of interest rates that is associated with this objective is often labeled as the policy neutral rate.
In this regard, Woodford (2003) notes that central banks should on average track the policy neutral rate to stabilize the economy. In a similar fashion, Taylor (1999) emphasizes that the measurement of the policy neutral rate is one of the key issues for countries targeting inflation. In this respect, it is of great importance for central banks to identify as precisely as possible the policy neutral rate. This is quite an intricate exercise, as the policy neutral rate is unobservable; however its mis-measurement is high-priced, as it may result in over-or undershooting the inflation target.
In this light, it is quite striking that remarkably little evidence is available for Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) on the estimation of the policy neutral rate. While there are dozens of studies on equilibrium exchange rates in the new EU members, there is surprisingly very little evidence on equilibrium interest rates (Brzoza-Brzezina, 2006 , seems to be the only exception, with evidence on Poland). This imbalance is rather paradoxical, as half the new EU members target inflation (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia) , for which the concept of the policy neutral rate is of primary importance for the conduct of monetary policy. 2 Consequently, this paper tries to bridge this gap.
This paper addresses the issue of policy neutral rate estimation in one of the new EU member states, the Czech Republic, based on various specifications of simple Taylor-type monetary policy rules. This former transition country provides an interesting case to evaluate the policy neutral interest rate, as one can expect a certain pattern in the path of nominal and real equilibrium interest rates over the longer term (note that the policy neutral rate is in fact the short-term nominal equilibrium interest rate; more on definitions below). Lipschitz et al. (2006) point out that at the outset of the transition the capital/labor ratios were much lower than those in Western Europe and therefore the marginal product of capital and for that reason the real equilibrium interest rate were rather high. Given the capital accumulation over the course of the transition, there should be a tendency for the real equilibrium interest rate to decrease. From an open economy perspective, the new EU members exhibited falling exchange rate risk premium during their transition process to a market economy (Beneš and N'Diaye, 2004) , which also puts downward pressure on real equilibrium interest rates (Archibald and Hunter, 2001) . Analogously, it is a well-documented empirical regularity that these countries exhibit real equilibrium exchange rate appreciation (see Égert et al., 2006 for a comprehensive survey of the sources of appreciation). A decrease in the foreign equilibrium interest rate, which is reported by several authors for the euro area (e.g. Wintr et al., 2005) , may, especially in a small open economy, reduce the level of the domestic equilibrium interest rate as well. Additionally, the path of nominal equilibrium interest rates should reflect not only the decrease of real equilibrium rates, but also successful disinflation in transition countries (see Korhonen and Wachtel, 2006) . All in all, the aforementioned arguments provide a rationale for modeling the policy neutral rate as time-varying.
In this paper we provide first an estimation of monetary policy rules with a time-varying intercept to assess the fluctuations of the policy neutral interest rate over time. The novelty of our approach lies in estimation of the policy neutral rate by the time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim, 2006) . 3 Unlike the 'conventional' time-varying parameter model 4 , this approach is robust to endogeneity of the explanatory variables, which is indeed relevant when estimating the monetary policy rules. While endogeneity is almost always accounted for in the literature on time-invariant monetary policy rules, as it is estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM), it is almost never addressed in studies on time-varying policy rules. An additional feature of this paper is that we utilize ex-post as well as real-time based data (see e.g. Orphanides, 2001 , on real-time data analysis within a monetary policy rules framework), specifically the real-time output gap and real-time inflation forecast of the Czech National Bank (CNB), to estimate the monetary policy rules.
One of our primary policy applications, except for measuring the policy neutral rate by a novel technique, is also to propose a measure of the monetary policy stance based on the deviation of the actual interest rate from the estimated policy neutral rate. Anticipating our results, we find this measure of the monetary policy stance quite useful in predicting both the level and change of the future inflation rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 gives the results of the estimation of time-varying estimates of the policy neutral rate as well as an analysis of the ability of the monetary policy stance to predict future inflation developments. Section 5 concludes. An appendix with additional results follows.
Related Literature

Methodological Background
It has been acknowledged in monetary economics for a long time that there exists some unobservable real interest rate that equilibrates aggregate demand and aggregate supply (Woodford, 2003) . When the actual real interest rate is equal to the unobservable one, price stability is achieved. This unobservable rate is often labeled as the natural rate of interest or equilibrium interest rate. Equivalently, it has been noted that the equilibrium interest rate is the real interest rate that prevails when prices are fully flexible in all markets (Neiss and Nelson, 2003; Woodford, 2003) .
Consequently, the equilibrium interest rate or natural rate of interest is a fairly general concept and in principle it may be well associated with short-term, medium-term or long-term interest rates. In this context, it is worth pointing out that the determinants of the equilibrium interest rate are likely to differ according to time horizon (different frequency movements). In the long-term, the level of the equilibrium interest rate is influenced by supply-side structural characteristics of economy such as long-run growth potential, which in turn depends on technological progress, population growth and inter-temporal substitution of consumption (Crespo-Cuaresma et al., 2005) . In the medium-term, the equilibrium interest rate is associated with business cycle fluctuations. In the short-term, the equilibrium interest rate is linked mainly to demand factors related to monetary policy and its targeting horizon (Archibald and Hunter, 2001 ). Here monetary policy may systematically influence inflation expectations and in turn the level of the short-term nominal equilibrium rate.
For the purposes of monetary policy conduct, it is vital to know which interest rate level the monetary authority should set in order to achieve price stability (i.e. neutral policy stance). As the primary monetary policy instrument is the level of the short-term interest rate, the equilibrium interest rate in this context is a rather short-term concept and is often labeled as the policy neutral rate (Coats et al., 2003; Lam and Tkacz, 2004; Beneš et al., 2005) . The policy neutral rate thus represents the nominal equilibrium interest rate and is defined as the real equilibrium interest rate plus expected inflation (Coats et al., 2003) . In other words, the policy neutral rate is linked to the short-term nominal interest rate, over which the central bank has substantial control, and thus the policy neutral rate may be understood as a rather narrower concept in comparison to equilibrium interest rate and natural rate of interest.
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Should interest rate policy of the monetary authority strictly follow the neutral rate when targeting inflation? Not necessarily. The first point is that obviously there is uncertainty in policy neutral rate measurement. Second, and more importantly, there are shocks to which it is sub-optimal for the authority to react. More specifically, central banks may wish deliberately not to react to the first-round effects of cost-push shocks, as this can be destabilizing to the economy in the short run. This may, however, alter the inflation expectations of economic agents, if some fraction of them are myopic, and as a result, induce a change in the policy neutral rate. In such case, the central bank's interest rate policy may temporarily deviate from the policy neutral rate.
Methods for Natural Rate of Interest Estimation
Generally, there are several main methods for estimating the natural rate of interest (see e.g. Giammarioli and Valla, 2004 , for a survey). 6 The simplest is to assume that the equilibrium is 5 For convenience, we use policy neutral rate, natural rate of interest and equilibrium interest rate in the following text interchangeably to a certain extent. However, when we want to emphasize the short-run concept of it, we always use the term policy neutral rate. 6 Note that we do not present the exhaustive list of methods for equilibrium interest rate estimation, for example Brzoza-Brzezina (2006) proposes a structural vector autoregression model in this regard. In general, the role of the equilibrium interest rate for monetary policy conduct is discussed extensively by Taylor (1993 ), Woodford (2003 and Amato (2005) .
captured reasonably well by some univariate trend such as an HP filter. Nevertheless, a number of papers document that the estimates based on these filters are often misleading (Clark and Kozicki, 2005) . In general, the limitations of the univariate methods have been pointed out by many authors (e.g. Canova, 1998) .
Another method for deriving equilibrium interest rates is based on the estimation of a simple monetary policy rule of the central bank (Taylor, 1993) . The reaction function typically associates short-term interest rate with its lagged value, the difference between inflation (forecast) and its target, and the output gap. The intercept of the estimated reaction function can be interpreted as the nominal equilibrium interest rate (that is, the interest rate that would prevail when inflation and output are at their targeted values). This method has been applied to estimate the equilibrium interest rates by e.g. Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 and Orphanides (2001) for the United States and Germany, Adam et al. (2005) for the United Kingdom, and Roffia (2004, 2005) for the euro area. Nevertheless, the assumption of constant equilibrium interest rates is often found too restrictive over the longer term. Consequently, a number of studies model the equilibrium interest rate, or more generally the monetary policy rule as time-varying (see Plantier and Scrimgeour, 2002 , Elkhoury, 2006 , and Kim and Nelson, 2006 . Typically, these studies find a rationale for modeling the rule as time-varying, given that the equilibrium interest rate sometimes fluctuates considerably over longer time horizons (as do other parameters in the policy rule). Generally, the monetary policy rules approach measures the behavior of the central bank and assumes that the central bank estimates equilibrium interest rates correctly. In case of systematic mis-measurement of equilibrium rates by the central bank, it is likely that the equilibrium rates retrieved from the estimation of the reaction function are mis-measured as well.
Structural time series models represent another common method for measuring equilibrium interest rates. The primary contribution in this area is Laubach and Williams (2003) , who formulate a simple empirical model containing an IS curve, a Phillips curve and an equation linking the equilibrium interest rate to trend growth, and model equilibrium interest rates and potential output as unobserved components. Their method has gained popularity recently and has been applied by Manrique and Marques (2004) for the U.S. and Germany, Mesonnier and Renne (2007) for the euro area, and Wintr, Guarda and Rouabah (2005) for the euro area 7 and Luxembourg as well. In principle, the joint estimation of equilibrium interest rates and the output gap is an advantage of this approach; however it also reduces the degrees of freedom, which may be an issue for transition countries with rather short time series.
Equilibrium interest rates can also be estimated within stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models. The advantage of this type of literature is that it specifies the structure of the economy and thus in principle allows identification of a variety of shocks hitting the economy. On the other hand, Levin et al. (1999) find that more complex models seem to be less robust to model uncertainty (see also Giammarioli and Valla, 2004) . Consequently, these model outcomes may be quite sensitive to model assumptions. The recent examples of this approach to estimating equilibrium interest rates include Giammarioli and Valla (2003) , Neiss and Nelson (2003) and Smets and Wouters (2003) .
The last major stream of literature estimates equilibrium interest rates from the yield curve and asset pricing models. Bomfim (2001) uses inflation linked bonds in order to eliminate the distortions from inflation expectations and retrieves equilibrium interest rates from the realized yields on U.S. Treasury inflation-indexed securities. In this regard, Giammarioli and Valla (2004) discuss equilibrium interest rate estimates in relation to consumption capital asset pricing models. Generally, this stream of literature hinges on the notion of liquid financial markets and thus this approach is viable mainly for countries with developed financial markets.
Data and Empirical Methodology
In this part, we discuss the methodology and dataset we employ to evaluate the policy neutral rate fluctuations in the Czech Republic. Specifically, we estimate a variety of backward or forward looking monetary policy rules with a time-varying policy neutral rate.
Monetary Policy Rules
A starting point for a formal derivation of the monetary policy rule is the reasonable assumption that the central bank targets to set the nominal interest rate in line with the state of the economy (see Clarida et al., 1998 Clarida et al., , 2000 , as postulated in Eq. (1): E is the expectation operator and t Ω is the information set available at the time when interest rates are set. Hereinafter, we set i either equal to 12 months to reflect the CNB's actual targeting horizon 8 or alternatively equal to 0, i.e. using the current inflation for the sensitivity analysis. Therefore, Eq. (1) links targeted nominal interest rates to a constant (i.e. the interest rate -policy neutral rate -that would prevail when expected inflation and output are at their targeted levels), the deviation of expected inflation from the target and the output gap.
Nevertheless, Eq. (1) is often argued to be too restrictive, as it does not account for interest rate smoothing of central banks. Clarida et al. (1998) assume that the central bank adjusts the interest rate sluggishly to the targeted value. This is so for a number of reasons. For example, Goodfriend (1991) puts forward concerns over the stability of financial markets. Sack (1997) highlights uncertainty about the effects of interest rate changes on the economy. 9 Instead of an explicit 8 This is in line with the CNB main forecasting model -the Quarterly Prediction Model; see Coats et al., 2003. The actual targeting horizon is 12-18 months, but due to data limitations we prefer to work with 12 months. In general, see Batini and Nelson, 1999 , for contributions on the optimal targeting horizon. Note also that the policy neutral rate is defined as the real rate plus the expected inflation in period t+k, where k is given by the maturity of the interbank rate (in our case k=3). k is thus different from the forecasting horizon i. As argued by Clarida et al. (2000) , this is not very relevant in practice, as the short-term interbank interest rates at various maturities are strongly linked together. Indeed, the correlation of 3M PRIBOR and 12M PRIBOR -to reflect that i=12 -stands at 0.99 in our sample. 9 Nevertheless, Rudebusch (2006) recently questioned the extent of monetary policy inertia and argued that the inertia is rather low.
listing of various factors behind the interest rate smoothing, Clarida et al. (1998) 
) and is thus orthogonal to all information available at time t ( t Ω ).
Next, in order to estimate the time-varying neutral policy rate we apply a structural time-varying coefficient model with endogenous regressors. Kim (2006) shows that the conventional timevarying parameter model delivers inconsistent estimates when explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance term, which is indeed relevant when estimating policy rules. It is interesting to note that the correlation of (3) is almost always taken into account in empirical work on time-invariant rules (as typically estimated by the GMM), while it is almost never considered in the literature on time-varying monetary policy rules (Kim and Nelson, 2006 , seem to be the exception). Subsequently, Kim (2006) derives a consistent estimator of the timevarying parameter model when regressors are endogenous. In line with Kim (2006) , we estimate the following empirical model:
The measurement equation (4) is a Taylor rule with the policy neutral rate, t r _ , as outlined above. However, we relax here the assumption of a constant policy neutral rate and let it vary over time, t r _ , as specified in the transition equation (5), assuming a random walk process without drift.
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Given the data limitations and the fact that our sample is characterized by a relatively stable 10 We estimated the monetary policy rules including higher lags of interest rates, but failed to find them significant. 11 We also experimented with an AR(1) structure in Eq. (5), but it just marginally reduced the likelihood and the estimated AR parameter was very close to one, anyway.
institutional structure as well as actual conduct of monetary policy, we do not allow α , β and ρ to be time-varying. The 'first-stage' Eqs. (6) and (7) (4) are then obtained in two steps. In the first step, we estimate the equations (6) and (7) (6) and (7), to address the aforementioned endogeneity of the regressors. Consequently, the estimated parameters in Eq. (8) ( ) ( )
Several authors (see for example Gerdesmeier and Roffia, 2004) In other words, additional variables that do not enter Taylor rule directly may influence inflation and output and therefore the interest rate setting indirectly. It is also important to emphasize that CPI inflation targeting, as opposed to domestic inflation targeting, has an implicit concern for foreign shocks given the composition of the consumer basket (Svensson, 2000) . Therefore, in our paper we do not introduce foreign disturbances explicitly in the monetary policy rule, but we will employ them as the instruments in our empirical specification.
Additionally, in a book describing the current forecasting and policy analysis process in the CNB, Coats et al. (2003) report that no other variables than inflation and the output gap enter into the monetary policy rule in the CNB Quarterly Projection Model (QPM hereinafter). In particular, as regards exchange rate fluctuations the CNB has stated several times that it does not directly react to them. It has acknowledged that the exchange rate plays an important role for inflation developments in small open economies and that it might react indirectly to exchange rate fluctuations if they jeopardize inflation developments (Kotlán and Navrátil, 2003) . Regarding money aggregates, one can expect that an inflation targeting central bank in general views them as only supplementary information about the degree of economic activity and/or inflationary pressures, and also does not directly react to them.
Originally, the design of the Taylor rule lacked a forward-looking element characteristic of the modern monetary policy conduct. An additional way of assessing the sensitivity of our results is to estimate of both backward-and forward-looking Taylor-type rules. Therefore, we formulate the monetary policy rule in Eq. (3) in the case of backward-looking policy rule such that we set 0 = i , i.e. we use current inflation rate instead of its forecasted value (which is utilized for the forwardlooking policy rule). Another important point has been raised about the timeliness of information in monetary policy conduct (Orphanides, 2001) . Output data are typically revised at a later stage, but monetary policy is conducted based on the information available at the time. Therefore, we collect real-time based CNB output gap estimates (note that inflation is not revised at a later stage by the Czech Statistical Office) and re-estimate the monetary policy rule with the real-time output gap. Analogously, we use one year ahead CNB's real-time inflation forecast in estimating the monetary policy rule.
There are further modeling issues stemming from the fact that the policy interest rate is not changed in a continuous fashion. For instance, the CNB Bank Board meets on a monthly basis to discuss the policy interest rate settings. Besides, the policy rate change itself is not continuous. Typically, if the rates are changed, the respective magnitude is 0.25 percentage points (or some multiple of 0.25), even if the change maximizing economic stability according to the model-based forecast might be of a (slightly) different magnitude. In consequence, the policy rate is not only discrete, but also censored. Given the inherent censoring of policy interest rates, the majority of authors, such as Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 and Adam et al. (2005) , rely on using the 3-month interbank rate as an approximation of the censored policy rate.
On the other hand, Choi (1999) and Carstensen (2006) put forward modeling censoring in the policy rate directly by employing for example a modified Tobit model and an ordered probit model, respectively. The advantage of this approach is that it models the interest rate setting more realistically and does not have to make a simplifying assumption by utilizing the short-term interbank rate. On the other hand, this stream of literature so far models only censoring in the policy rate, but it has been stressed that there is also censoring in the policy rate change (Podpiera, 2006) . In addition, censored models are known to be less efficient and the results based on them do not seem to stand up in sharp contrast to those using short-term interbank rates (for example, consider the extent of interest rate smoothing). An additional drawback of this approach in our case is that our main estimation technique is a time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim, 2006) and to our knowledge this technique is simply not available with a censored dependent variable. Besides, the CNB's QPM also uses the 3-month interbank rate instead of the 2-week policy rate as well. Having all the pros and cons of these two approachesshort-term interbank rate vs. policy interest rate -in mind, we opt to use the short-term interbank rate in the estimation of the monetary policy rules. 
Data
Results
Time-varying Equilibrium Interest Rates
Generally, we find that the policy neutral rate decreases over time, as depicted in Chart 1. This is in line with our conjecture laid out in the introduction. We report all specifications, from the backward-looking policy rule with the output gap estimated by the HP filter to the forwardlooking rule with the real-time output gap. 12 The standard smoothing parameter of 14440 has been used. Different smoothing parameters, such as the one suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) , had very little impact on the resulting estimates of the policy neutral rate. The output gap derived from HP filter estimates of potential output differs considerably from those used by the CNB -see Chart B.2 in the Appendix. Note that the output gap from the CNB's QPM is constructed using a multivariate Kalman filter. Generally, output gap estimates based on the HP filter can be viewed as less reliable, but we keep them in our empirical work, as this gap is replicable based on publicly available data, which is not the case with the two other output gap measures derived from the CNB's QPM. Note also that the HP filter is known to suffer from end-point bias, making it cumbersome for real-time analysis. 13 We also used a quadratic match procedure for interpolation. This yields only little differences for the resulting output gap estimates. We are aware that interpolation introduces information not available at the time in the case of the output gap. 14 These results are available upon request. As net inflation is largely correlated with headline CPI inflation (a value of 0.93 in our sample), it is not surprising that the results are quite similar. 15 The increase at the end of sample period is likely to reflect higher inflation expectations of economic agents. The CNB conducts regularly a survey on inflation expectations of financial markets, households and nonfinancial firms (actual numbers are easily available from CNB website within their public database ARAD). Inflation expectations of financial markets for the 1 year horizon have risen from some 2.5% in mid 2005 to 3% over the course of 2006. Similar pattern is visible also for household's and firm's expectations.
expected inflation -to reflect the European Central Bank definition of price stability, we receive an estimate of the policy neutral rate of about 3% for the euro area. The results actually suggest that the Czech policy neutral rate seems to be slightly below the euro area level. This should not come as a surprise, as actual short-term interest rates were also often below those in the euro area (except for several months in 2004, Czech rates appear to be below euro area rates from around mid-2002 onwards).
Detailed parameter estimates of the monetary policy rules are presented in the Appendix - Table  A. 2. The degree of interest rate smoothing falls considerably when allowing for time-varying parameter specification. Compared to the case of the constant policy neutral assumption, which is estimated by the GMM 16 , the value of the interest rate smoothing parameter falls from around 0.9 to 0.4. Time-invariant rules thus appear to overestimate substantially the degree of interest rate smoothing. This complies with the results of Rudebusch (2006), who stresses that once one accounts for expectations about future monetary policy, the actual policy rate inertia is in fact quite low. The standard errors of the estimates are in some cases large, probably reflecting the smaller sample size. The coefficient on inflation is around 0.3 in the case of the backward-looking specifications (interestingly, it is significant only when we introduce bias correction terms, t ϕ and t ν ), and insignificant for the forward-looking specifications. The coefficient on the output gap is around 0.6 when it is significant; otherwise it is smaller for other specifications.
Additionally, the results support the usefulness of applying the time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. The bias correction terms, t ϕ and t ν , in Eq. (8), are typically significant and the log likelihood improves after their inclusion. Comparing the estimated policy neutral rate with those implied by the conventional time-varying parameter model, we find that the resulting difference between these two varies according to the specification of the policy rule as well as over time. While the median difference is only 0.05 p.p. in absolute terms, the maximum difference that the inclusion of bias correction terms amounts to is 1.8 p.p. 
Note:
The policy neutral rate ±2 standard errors is reported. The measure of the output gap and inflation used for estimation of the policy neutral rate is reported below each chart. The timevarying parameter model is labeled as conventional when it does not account for endogeneity of regressors.
Monetary Policy Stance and Inflation Developments
There is a discussion in the literature about to what extent monetary policy rules provide a useful framework to evaluate the monetary policy stance and its impact on subsequent inflation. This is typically done by comparing the actual interest rate setting with the one implied by the rule and inflation outcomes. For example, Taylor (1999, p. 340) labels the difference as the policy mistakes (i.e. the residual from the policy rule) and shows that they are well associated with high inflation or low capacity utilization with the U.S. data. On the other hand, Reynard (2007) , analyzing the U.S. and Swiss data, questions the reliability of the so-called policy mistakes, as he observes rather weak link between so-called policy mistakes and inflation relative to the inflation target.
Here we propose a rather different framework to evaluate the usefulness of policy rules. Instead of focusing on the residual from the policy rule, we analyze the deviation of actual interest rates from the policy neutral rate ("equilibrium rate") and its impact on subsequent inflation. We leave examination of the link between policy mistakes and inflation outcomes for further research, as we do not concentrate in this paper on whether the estimated monetary policy rule provides an accurate description of CNB policy, but rather on the estimation and evolution of the policy neutral rate. Implicitly, by carrying out this estimation we also address the issue of the uncertainty surrounding with equilibrium interest rate measurement (see Laubach and Williams, 2003, or Herrmann, Orphanides and Siklos, 2005 , on this uncertainty). In this regard, Amato (2005) emphasizes that the uncertainty in neutral rate estimates makes it difficult to use them as a reliable indicator of excess demand pressures, but the theories of neutral interest rates still remain a useful concept for the formulation of monetary policy.
So, our simple test here is to examine whether our estimated policy neutral rate is helpful in predicting future inflation developments. If the policy neutral rate is too uncertain a measure, then it is more likely that it does not provide information for subsequent inflation. Our supposition is thus that when the actual interest rate is above the policy neutral rate, the future inflation rate is then likely to fall, as monetary policy can be considered restrictive, and vice versa. We label the difference between the actual interest rate and the policy neutral rate as the monetary policy stance hereinafter.
The generic monetary policy stance is plotted in Chart 2. 18 As we also have confidence intervals for the policy neutral rate, it is possible to evaluate whether the stance was statistically different Note: Positive values refer to monetary policy tightening, while negative values point to policy easing.
As there are transmission lags between a monetary policy action and its impact on the bank's targeted variables, we assume that the current monetary policy stance affects inflation after 12 to 24 months. This coincides well with the CNB monetary policy horizon, as the bank acknowledges that "…interest rate changes have their greatest impact on inflation some 12 to 18 months …" (CNB). It is also supported by the empirical findings of Borys-Morgese and Horvath (2007) . Within their factor augmented VAR framework, they find that the peak response of inflation to interest rate shocks is around a year or so (note the maximum reaction of non-tradable inflation is found to be close to two years). Based on this evidence, it seems to be fruitful to analyze the horizon between about one and two years. Here we broadly follow the empirical specification by Moser et al. (2007) , which is a variant of Stock and Watson (1999) . While these two studies examine the role of factor models for inflation forecasting, we analyze the impact of the monetary policy stance instead. More specifically, we test the significance of monetary policy stance indicator, including it in an autoregressive-type model for the inflation process.
Our estimation framework begins with the following regression: where for simplicity we set n=4.
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Using Eqs. (9) and (10), we investigate the information content of the monetary policy stance on the future level of inflation. We also re-specify the above equations to address the future change in the inflation rate as follows: The results from Eq. (9) are given in Table 1 . Our definition of the monetary policy stance seems to be informative for future inflation, explaining typically about 1/3 of its variance. These results are largely confirmed when controlling for the lagged inflation terms, as suggested by the estimation of Eq. (10) presented in Table 2 . The results suggest that when the actual interest rate is 10% above the policy neutral rate, inflation is likely to fall by about 1 p.p. at the monetary policy horizon. Similarly, the policy neutral rate seems to be a relatively good predictor of the future change of the inflation rate, as presented in Table 3 . This result is largely robust to the inclusion of lagged inflation as well (see Table 4 ). All in all, the results support the usefulness of the policy neutral rate in understanding the future behavior of inflation.
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Conclusions
This paper analyzes the policy neutral rate in the Czech Republic. In order to do so, we estimate various specifications of simple Taylor-type monetary policy rules at monthly frequency from 2001:1 to 2006:9. To address the sensitivity of results, the specifications differ based on whether we include real-time or ex-post revised data, employ backward or forward-looking monetary policy rules or vary the measure of the output gap.
As we focus on the fluctuations of the policy neutral rate over time, we use a time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors (Kim, 2006) . This approach is especially appealing for estimating monetary policy rules, as it addresses the endogeneity of inflation (forecast) and output gap. Indeed, the results support the usefulness of applying the time-varying parameter model with endogenous regressors. The bias correction terms, accounting for the endogeneity of the regressors, are typically significant. The log likelihood improves after their inclusion and the estimated path of the policy neutral rate is for certain periods considerably different from the estimates ignoring the endogeneity.
The results indicate that the policy neutral rate decreases gradually over the course of the sample period from around 5% in 2001 to about 2.5% in 2006, showing substantial interest rate convergence to levels comparable to the euro area. Over the longer term, the decrease may be supported by a number of factors such as capital accumulation, decrease in the risk premium, real equilibrium exchange rate appreciation as well as successful disinflation of the Czech economy and well-anchored inflation expectations.
One of our primary policy applications, besides measuring the policy neutral rate by a novel technique, is also to propose a measure of the monetary policy stance based on the deviation of the actual interest rate from the policy neutral rate. Our results indicate that this measure is quite useful in predicting future inflation developments, i.e. the monetary policy stance indicator affects the level as well as the change of the future inflation rate. In terms of future research, it would be interesting to see more evidence on other inflation targeting countries to uncover whether our proposed monetary policy stance measure remains a useful predictor of future inflation developments, as we find in the case of the Czech Republic. 
